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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
INTRODUCTION 
The South Coast Air Quality Management District (AQMD) has proposed an annual 
RECLAIM Trading Credit (RTC) with uniform issue and compliance dates as the trading 
instrument for its market-based regulatory program. The proposed design for this 
instrument carries potential problems for both RECLAIM facilities and AQMD, including 
market imbalances, price volatility, economic inefficiencies, and an increase in ambient 
emission peaks. These problems result directly from the design of the instrument, and they 
can be alleviated through the selection of alternate design variables and a change in the 
allocation of RTCs to RECLAIM facilities. Both the problems and the effectiveness of the 
solutions have been tested and documented in experiments conducted in the Laboratory for 
Experimental Economics and Political Science at the California Institute of Technology. 
CRITICAL VARIABLES 
There are four sets of critical issues in the design of RECLAIM instruments and the trading 
markets for them: 
1. Issue and expiration dates of RTCs; 
2. Compliance and certification dates; 
3. The provision of a market during the reconciliation period, which occurs at 
the end of each compliance period; and 
4. The method of allocating RTCs to facilities. 
These issues should be resolved consistent with AQMD's overall program objectives for 
RECLAIM: 
Achieve an aggregate level of pollution abatement at minimum cost to facilities 
in the L.A. Basin. 
Promote economic efficiency. 
The RTC instrument design terms are interactive and integral to achieving these goals. Their 
variability offers many possible structural alternatives for the instrument. 
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DESIGN ALTERNATIVE 1: UNIFORM RTCs 
In this alternative, all RTCs are valid for emissions in a single (calendar or fiscal) year. All 
expire on the same date, which coincides with the end of the annual compliance period. 
This alternative was presented in the RECLAIM Proposed Rules issued in November 
1992. 
Potential Problems 
1. With all facilities submitting annual repons simultaneously, AQMD faces an overly 
burdensome administrative responsibility. 
2. With all RTCs expiring simultaneously, either of two equally undesirable situations is 
likely: 
A. As the compliance year ends, facilities are likely to see a shonage of RTCs 
available in the market, with those offered commanding extremely high 
prices; or 
B. Anticipating a shonage of credits at year-end, facilities may hold RTCs 
substantially above their emissions levels. If they turn to the market to sell 
excess credits at yearend, the market may be glutted with RTCs and prices 
will fall to zero. Unused or unsold RTCs represent a loss of economic 
opponunity for the facilities and the Basin as a whole. 
3. The inability to sell "excess" RTCs at yearend may prompt facilities to increase 
production in order to capture (some portion of) the rerriaining economic value of the 
instrument. This action increases the potential for emission peaks and violations of air 
quality standards. In essence, the design of the RTC can artificially synchronize facilities' 
emissions at yearend. 
DESIGN ALTERNATIVE 2: STAGGERED COMPLIANCE 
If RECLAIM facilities are divided into two groups with annual compliance deadlines six 
months apan, AQMD would not face such a heavy administrative burden. The remaining 
problems of Uniform RTCs, however, are not resolved by this alternative. 
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DESIGN ALTERNATIVE 3: STAGGERED ISSUE DATES, STAGGERED 
COMPLIANCE DATES 
This alternative addresses both the problems of AQMD's administrative task and the absence 
of market liquidity at yearend. It provides for two sets of instruments, each valid in a 
different, overlapping, 12-month period. Half the RTCs are issued in January (with a 
December expiration date), half in July (with a June expiration date in the following year). 
Either instrument can be used by any RECLAIM facility to cover emissions during the time 
the RTC is valid. The compliance dates are also staggered as in Design Alternative 2.1 
Advantages 
1. Business gains flexibility, particularly as annual compliance dates approach. The 
availability of two sets of RTCs allows facilities to more easily accommodate 
unanticipated events. 
2. There is less likelihood of artificial synchronization of emissions. 
3. Price volatility induced by the Uniform RTC is eliminated, and market prices will more 
accurately reflect the marginal costs of pollution abatement, an indication of, and 
requirement for, economic efficiency. 
4. Staggered RTCs enhance the effectiveness of a reconciliation period. 
Drawbacks 
In order to implement the Staggered RTC program, the AQMD must distribute the 
allocations with a slightly more complicated procedure. As the program continues, the 
AQMD must maintain records on more than one instrument. 
ALLOCATING STAGGERED RTCs 
Facilities are divided into two groups. Each facility can receive its entire allocation in one 
type of RTC (e.g., January to December credits), or it can receive a "mixed" allocation, 
where half the RTCs are valid from January to December, half from July to June. Either 
allocation method avoids the problems of Uniform RTCs. A mixed allocation distributes the 
benefits of staggering directly to facilities, avoiding forced use of the market -- and 
!For simplicity, we have set compliance dates to coincide with the expiration dates of the RTCs facilities 
are initially issued, but this is not necessary. 
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associated transaction costs -- to obtain the stagger. In addition, a mixed allocation helps 
the AQMD to provide equitable markets and adds RTCs generated from sources not initially 
directly in RECLAIM (e.g. RTCs from mobile source retirement). 
RECONCILIATION 
A reconciliation period offers facilities an opportunity to include more accurate information 
in emissions reports and to adjust RTC holdings accordingly, provided of course that the 
RTC market is open and available during reconciliation. Absent reconciliation with an open 
market, facilities have strong incentives to hold credits in excess of their emissions, or to 
report emissions above actual levels to avoid noncompliance penalties due to inadequate 
information and unanticipated events. 
Staggered RTCs enhance the efficiency of reconciliation. With Uniform RTCs, facilities are 
likely to have excess, expired credits during and after reconciliation, having held credits as 
insurance against non-compliance risk. Staggered RTCs, on the other hand, allow facilities 
to hold unexpired credits (those with a remaining life of six months) as insurance, reducing 
the effective cost of the insurance premium to zero. 
CONCLUSION 
We recommend the following: 
1. Stagger RTC compliance dates to reduce AQMD's administrative burden; 
2. Stagger RTC issue dates to reduce price volatility and enhance market liquidity; 
3. Distribute RTCs to facilities through a mixed allocation method to avoid transaction costs 
and avoid inequities in distribution; and 
4. Provide a reconciliation period with an open market each compliance quarter for all 
RECLAIM facilities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The South Coast Air Quality Management District (AQMD) has proposed a market-based 
regulatory system relying on tradable emission allowances, to achieve an aggregate level of 
pollution abatement at minimum cost to facilities in the Los Angeles Basin. The program is 
called "RECLAIM" -- the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market 
AQMD counts as critical, among its program objectives, the efficiency of the market for 
RECLAIM Trading Credits (R TCs). It is equally important for those credits, once issued, 
to be used in their most economically efficient manner. In both cases, the terms and 
allocation method of RTCs will influence the realization of AQMD's objectives and, hence, 
the success of RECLAIM. This paper reviews the variable terms available to define RTCs 
and to distribute RTCs to RECLAIM facilities. It also discusses the benefits of providing a 
reconciliation period with an open market. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
The consultants make several key assumptions in this discussion. 
1. While the length of time RTCs are valid could vary, we assume RTCs are an annual, 
fixed-term credit governing emissions over a 12-month period. 
2. Each RTC carries the right to emit one unit of pollutant, and that unit is a pound. The 
analyses here are not dependent on this amount, nor would they be affected by a choice 
of tons, rather than pounds, of pollution. Market liquidity and participation are, of 
course, dependent on the size of the RTC -- size determines the usefulness of the credit 
and its accessibility to a range of potential users. 
3. Three pollutants -- oxides of nitrogen (NOx), oxides of sulfur (SOx), and reactive 
organic compounds (ROC) -- are regulated under RECLAIM. Each RTC covers 
emissions of one, and there are separate markets for each set of RTCs; "inter-pollutant" 
trading is not allowed. There are also restrictions limiting trading activity between two 
geographic zones, which are discussed. 
4. RTCs cannot be "banked"; facilities cannot carry unused credits forward or backward to 
cover emissions outside the period for which the RTCs are issued. 
5. AQMD reporting requirements will remain largely as proposed: Facilities will certify 
emissions quarterly (and annually), and are subject to findings of violation any time 
certified emissions exceed either holdings of RTCs or annual facility emissions caps, or if 
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reports are found by audit to be inaccurate. · 
RTCs AS FACTORS OF PRODUCTION 
Each RTC represents a factor of production for a facility, with an expiration date and, 
hence, a time-value. Depending on the terms defining RTCs, the credits may not, as factors 
of production, have any short-term substitute(s). RECLAIM facilities must hold RTCs to 
operate if they emit any of the pollutants regulated in the program. 
DEFINITIONS 
Is.sue date. The first day a pollutant can be emitted under the authority conveyed by the 
RTC. 
Expiration Date. The last day a pollutant can be emitted under the authority conveyed by 
the RTC. The RTC may remain eligible for trading or transfer under some limited 
reconciliation period (see below); however, no emissions can be attributed to a RTC after its 
expiration date. RTCs expire on a date certain, used or unused. Expiration dates are used 
to distinguish RTCs in this paper.2 
Compliance Date. The last day of the compliance period, which is the interval over 
which a facility sums its emissions of each pollutant for certification and reporting to 
AQMD. 
Certification Date. The date by which facilities must submit emissions reports to 
AQMD. Certification dates may fall anytime after compliance dates (usually 30 days). 
Reconciliation Period. The interval between the compliance and certification dates, 
when facilities gather the information needed to complete compliance reports and trade 
RTCs in order to balance emission accounts. 
21n financial markets. derivative instruments, including options and futures contracts, are referred to as 
"June calls" or "December puts," indicating the last (or only} date the rights and obligations conferred by 
sellers can be exercised by buyers. Derivatives are expected to be available on RTCs, and it would seem 
appropriate for AQMD to adopt this use of expiration dates to identify RECLAJM instruments. 
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RTC INSTRUMENT DESIGN VARIABLES 
Two variables define the terms of the RTC. A third defines its allocation. 
Issue dates. RTCs can have uniform issue dates (e.g., January 1) or staggered issue 
dates (i.e., half the RTCs could be valid each year beginning January 1, half on July 1). 
Compliance dates All facilities can be assigned to the same annual compliance schedule, 
with certified yearend emissions reports due December 31, for example, or the schedules 
can vary, with half the facilities reporting on December 31, half on June 30. 
Note that, as with issue and compliance dates, RTCs can have uniform expiration dates or 
staggered expiration dates (June 30 and December 31). The expiration date need not 
coincide with the compliance date, and is not considered a variable here. This analysis 
assumes the expiration date will fall 12 months after the issue date of any particular RTC. 
Allocation. RTCs will be distributed to facilities consistent with their baseline allocations 
of emissions, the process for which is under consideration. For this paper, the authors are 
concerned with the allocation of RTCs, not the determination of baseline emissions. The 
allocation of RTCs can be uniform, or, if there are several types of RTCs (distinguished by 
expiration dates), the allocation can vary between facilities (e.g., half the RECLAIM 
facilities receive one RTC, half another), or within facilities (facilities receive some of each 
RTC). 
ALTERNATIVE INSTRUMENT DESIGNS 
There are multiple instrument and allocation alternatives a.vailable based on the variables 
described above, and they are arrayed in Table 1. Four alternatives suggest advantages to 
AQMD and/or RECLAIM participants: 
1. Uniform issue, uniform compliance, uniform allocation. 
2. Uniform issue, staggered compliance, uniform allocation. 
3. Staggered issue, staggered compliance, divide allocation between facilities. 
4. Staggered issue, staggered compliance, divide allocation within facilities. 
In this paper, these design alternatives are evaluated for their ability to promote economic 
efficiency and mitigate market volatility . 
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Table 1 
Alternatives Discussed in Paper 
Issue and Allocation Method 
Uniform RTC Staggered RTC Staggered RTC 
Compliance allocation allocation 
across facilities vvi thin facilities 
Uniform Alt. 1 not discussed ( 5) not discussed ( 5) 
Staggered Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4 
1. Design Alternative l, uniform issue of RTCs and uniform compliance period schedules. 
2. Design Alternative 2 staggers the schedule of compliance periods while keeping the issue 
of RTCs uniform. 
3. Design Alternative 3 keeps the staggered compliance period schedules and staggers the 
issue dates of RTCs across facilities. 
4. Design Alternative 4 is a variation of Design Alternative 3. Issue and compliance dates 
remain staggered, but RTCs are allocated within facilities instead of across facilities. 
5. Uniform compliance with staggered RTC allocations is not discussed. The benefits are 
the same as the other staggered RTC alternatives, except the administrative benefits for 
the AQMD are absent 
DESIGN ALTERNATIVE 1: UNIFORM ISSUE, UNIFORM COMPLIANCE, 
UNIFORM ALLOCATION 
In the initial draft of RECLAIM rules, AQMD proposed allocating RTCs with uniform start 
and compliance dates to all RECLAIM facilities (Uniform RTCs). These credits would be 
valid for emissions released in a calendar (or fiscal) year, beginning on January 1 (or 
October 1), and expiring 12 months later on December 31 (or September 30). The credits 
would be valid only for the year issued, and could not be traded after the 
compliance/expiration date. In addition, AQMD proposed placing all facilities on the same 
compliance schedule. Figure 1 illustrates this allocation method for two facilities over the 
course of four years. Note that only one type of RTC is valid at any time. 
Potential Problems. While the uniform allocation of Uniform RTCs to all facilities is 
simple and straightforward, it carries several potential problems, both for economic 
efficiency and the efficiency of the market. This is particularly the case for facilities facing 
uncertain demand and/or prices for their products. 
As a year ends, facilities find that the flexibility to meet compliance standards declines while 
compliance costs rise. This, too, is simple and straightforward. At the beginning of the 
year, facilities have the entire annual allocation of RTCs available to cover emissions. Each 
quarter, however, RTCs are retired by AQMD, based on emission reports submitted by 
facilities (Figure 2). As the year progresses, fewer and fewer credits are available, either to 
trade or to cover emissions, and prices of RTCs offered in the market rise (Figure 3). In 
addition, with fewer available credits, facilities face greater difficulty and higher costs in 
responding to unanticipated events, such as a sudden increase in demand for their products 
or a sudden production outage. 
In terms of economic efficiency, facilities should hold credits sufficient to meet their 
expected emissions and sell the balance, thus maximizing value. But precisely how many 
RTCs should a facility hold throughout any given year, knowing that the cost of 
noncompliance is severe? How many should it trade? 
Assume, for example, that a RECLAIM facility has been allocated RTCs sufficient to emit 
100 pounds of pollution in 1995. Assume, further, that the facility reports emissions of 25 
pounds in the first quarter of 1995, 20 pounds in the second, and 20 pounds in the third, or 
65 pounds total, leaving 35 pounds of allowable emissions for the fourth quarter. 
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Figure 1 
Example: Allocation of Uniform RTCs 
Facility 
A 
B 
RTC 
allocation 
1/94 
1994 
200 
100 
RTCs expiring at the end of· 
1995 1996 
180 160 
90 80 
1/95 1/96 
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1997 
140 
70 
1/97 
I. I I. 
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Figure 3 
SHORTCOMINGS WITH UNIFORM RTCs 
As the compliance year ends: 
1. Flexibility diminishes: RTCs are retired and the market becomes 
thinner 
unused 
RTCs 
Issue Expiration 
(January,1994) (December, 1994) 
Issue Expiration 
(January,1995) (December, 1995) 
2. Total costs of compliance rise: prices of RTCs do not reflect 
the marginal costs of abatement 
dolJars 
Issue Expiration Issue Expiration 
(January,1994) (December, 1994) (January,1995) (December, 1995) 
Facilities find it more costly to respond to unanticipated 
events caused by: 
- measurement· uncertainties 
- business uncertainties 
12 ' 
To this point, the facility has pursued a conservative approach, declining all offers to sell 
credits in the first three quarters of the year, a reasonable strategy given the threat of 
substantial penalties for exceeding one's RTC allowance. The facility has essentially held 
"extra" credits as insurance, despite having a reasonable level of confidence that its 
emissions for the year will fall within permissible limits. This is a reasonable scenario, 
given the possibility of error in quarterly reports due to measurement or calibration 
deficiencies (a potential violation), and lack of experience with RECLAIM. 
As yearend approaches, the facility gains confidence in the accuracy of its reported 
emissions and, perhaps more importantly, the decreasing probability of an unexpected 
event. The facility determines that fourth-quarter emissions will total 25 pounds, leaving 10 
pounds of "extra" credits for the year. This is a "use-it-or-lose-it" proposition: excess 
credits expire worthless on December 31. They cannot be transferred to another facility 
after that date, and they cannot be banked for use in any subsequent compliance period. 
The facility has two choices for capturing some value from the excess units: increase fourth-
quarter production (within allowable limits), or sell the excess credits before yearend. An 
economically rational facility will try to pursue one, or a combination, (e.g., use five credits 
and sell the balance) of these alternatives. Any unused credits represent a lost opportunity 
for the facility, in either unrealized productive activity (economic efficiency) or unrealized 
market value (trading the credits for cash). Indeed, unused credits are a lost opportunity for 
the entire Basin: they could have been sold to and used by another RECLAIM facility, 
maximizing economic efficiency. 
Because it is unlikely any facility would knowingly pursue a strategy intended to put it at 
risk (given AQMD's significant noncompliance penalties), it is likely many facilities will 
pursue this "insurance strategy." If one facility ends a compliance year with a surplus of 
credits, other facilities will be in the same position. Consequently, if a facility turns to the 
market to sell unused credits (because it cannot increase production on short notice) it may 
very well find there is a surplus of credits offered in the market; that the quantity of credits 
supplied exceeds the quantity demanded. In such circumstances where the market is "long," 
bid prices will be low, and the facility may find that the acmal price for its RTCs is zero. 
In the alternative, despite its best efforts, it is possible a facility could approach yearend 
holding insufficient credits to cover its emissions. (This shortfall may result from 
inadequate or inaccurate information generated over the course of the year.) While there is 
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no reason to correlate reporting errors or deficiencies across facilities, it is possible other 
facilities will find themselves short, particularly if they have observed low prices for 
"insurance-induced" excess credits offered in the market at the end of earlier years. In this 
case, the market is short; RTC prices will be extremely high and may reach levels matching 
noncompliance costs.3 (An economically rational facility will not buy credits to cover a 
shortage if credit prices exceed AQMD noncompliance costs. It would, instead, simply pay 
the penalties.) 
In any case, it is highly unlikely that the quantity of RTCs available in the market will 
exactly match the quantity of RTCs demanded. Both "short" and "long" scenarios are 
possible, even with all random variables assumed to be independent across facilities. If 
emissions are correlated, however (due to cyclical fluctuations in general economic activity, 
for example), there is a greater probability the yearend market will be very short or very 
long on the expiration date. A facility's knowledge of its emissions increases as the year 
progresses, but the usable supply of credits available to cover emissions declines. In other 
words, facilities have their best information about year-to-date emissions in the fourth 
quarter, but the market may be thinnest (have the fewest credits available) in that quarter, or 
there may be an abundance of RTCs offered in the market, with each having little useful life 
remaining. Both situations create the potential for extreme market volatility -- the market is 
either "squeezed" with prices rising to the level of compliance penalties, or it is glutted with 
prices declining to zero. 
Uniform RTCs pose potential problems for AQMD as well as for business. The 
introduction of market emission credits artificially "synchronizes" facilities' emissions, 
carrying a risk of greater peak emission problems. A facility with excess credits at yearend 
has an incentive to either increase production in the fourth quarter to capture the remaining 
value of the RTCs, or sell the RTCs to a facility with the flexibility to increase production. If 
many facilities are in a similar position, there is a potential for unintentional ambient 
emission peaks in the fourth reporting period. 
If facilities are short credits and unable to acquire sufficient RTCs to cover projected fourth 
quarter emissions, they must either reduce production, or pay AQMD's compliance penalties 
for exceeding allowable emissions. Lost production represents lost employment, also an 
unintentional consequence of the terms and allocation of RTCs. 
3These costs include AQMD's penalties plus other costs a facility incurs for noncompliance· (legal fees, 
staff time, etc.). 
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Experimental Analysis and Observations. To determine market behavior under 
various instrument alternatives, we designed and conducted two pilot experiments, using the 
resources of Caltech's Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science. 
Subjects4 in the experiments traded Uniform "RTCs" in spot and forward markets5 
extending over five time periods ("years"). In other words, the experiments allowed the 
subjects to buy and sell "Year l" credits in the first time period, as well as credits valid in 
Years 2-5. Aggregate levels of allowable eml.ssions were reduced each period, just as 
AQMD is proposing for RECLAIM. A reconciliation period with an open market was 
available at the end of each period. 
Figure 4 shows a theoretical price path for each period and the actual time-series of contract 
prices (trades). The experimental results demonstrate that there is significant volatility with 
either price spikes or crashes during reconciliation . Details of the experimental procedures 
and additional data can be found in the appendix. 
RECONCILIATION PERIOD WITH AN OPEN MARKET: A SOLUTION? 
A limited reconciliation period (e.g., 30 days) following the end of each compliance quarter 
has been suggested as a remedy for the potential problems of Uniform RTCs. The 
suggestion includes an open market during reconciliation, where facilities can buy and sell 
any unused credits remaining after the compliance date up to the certification date. A 
reconciliation period can provide some benefits to facilities and other interested parties 
participating in RECLAIM. If, for example, there is a lag in emissions information (such 
that the information arrives between the compliance and certification dates), a reconciliation 
period will provide facilities an opportunity to obtain more precise information and adjust 
RTC holdings to match current emission calculations. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has developed a program somewhat similar to 
RECLAIM for controlling emissions that contribute to the formation of acid rain. EPA is 
providing a reconciliation period/market (an "extended allowance recordation period") for its 
program: EPA-regulated units have 30 days beyond the end of the compliance year to 
4Subjects were recruited from the Caltech undergraduate population. 
Sspot Market: market where commodity is traded for immediate (''on the spot") payment and delivery. Also 
called the "cash market" 
Forward Market market where commodity is ·traded for use and/or delivery at a later date. (Some, but not 
all, forward market contracts are futures contracts.) 
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Year 5 
trade allowances (there is no quarterly compliance and credit retirement). In its proposed 
rules, EPA outlined the value of reconciliation: 
The added time to transfer allowances into a unit's account would not compromise 
the emissions reductions requirements of the acid rain program, because only those 
allowances usable for the calendar year during which the emissions occurred would 
be transferable to the compliance subaccount for the year .... The extended transfer 
period .... does not increase the aggregate balance of allowances available for use 
for purposes of compliance in any year. The extended allowance transfer period is 
appropriate for several other reasons as well. The additional time ... would allow 
affected units to avoid violations where allowances are otherwise readily available 
for purchase to offset emissions,. .. avoid violations for unforeseen 
circumstances, ... [and] would not dampen incentives for prudent behavior or amplify 
perverse incentives. 6 
In its final rules for the Acid Rain program, EPA affirmed its opinion of reconciliation: 
As stated in the preamble to the proposed rule, EPA believes the additional flexibility 
of an extended allowance transfer period is important to the Acid Rain program and 
is also consistent with Congressional intent. 7 
Reconciliation would not result in emissions exceeding allowable limits, as the only credits 
available to facilities to cover excess emissions would be other facilities' unused credits 
valid during the same time period. Annual emission caps would thus remain in force, and 
any facility exceeding its cap and unable to obtain credits in the market would be subject to 
enforcement action. 
If a reconciliation period is provided, it must be sufficiently long to allow facilities to gather 
and assess the information necessary to determine whether their RTC accounts are long or 
short RTCs. If the reconciliation period ends before this information is available to 
facilities, it will be of little value, and may affect the holding of credits for "insurance" 
purposes. There are, therefore, two issues to address in designing a reconciliation 
period/market. First, the market must remain available until the certification date. Second,· 
the certification date must fall after the date facilities obtain more reliable information. 
To see the advantages of reconciliation, consider two RECLAIM facilities that reach year-
end 1994, one with 210 pounds of emissions (10 pounds above its allocation for the year), 
the other with 90 pounds of emissions (10 below its annual allocation) (Figure 5). Each has 
an annual compliance report due to the District by January 31, 1995. In the month of 
January, Facility A purchases the excess credits of Facility B. Both report to AQMD that 
6Pederal Register. Vol. 56, No. 232, December 3, 1991, p. 63049. 
?Federal Register. Vol. 58, No. 6. January 11. 1993, p. 3617. -
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Figure 5 
Reconciliation period 
Facility A Facility B 
RT Cs RT Cs 
2ool-~~~~~~~~~::::;:;;_,,,,-~~-
100 90 
cumulative use 
quarterly emissions ~ 
Facility A is "short" 10 RTCs at year-end. It has excess emissions. 
Facility Bis "long" 1 O RTCs. It has excess credits. 
-00 
; . .,; 
they are in compliance for 1994, both realize the full economic value of their allocated 
RTCs, and emissions in the Basin remain within allowable limits for 1994. 
A reconciliation market has merit -- providing additional time to facilities without allowing 
an increase in emissions -- and it can be adopted for any of the alternatives discussed in this 
paper, but it does not resolve all market and economic inefficiencies. A reconciliation period 
would not resolve the potential problems of market imbalances and economic inefficiency 
inherent in Uniform RTCs. Those problems are not caused by providing insufficient time 
for facilities to trade imbalances and reconcile long and short positions. They are caused by 
a lack of market liquidity; by the availability of only a single instrument that has no 
substitute. A reconciliation market for Uniform RTCs will, in fact, essentially be "a game of 
chicken." If the market is long in December '94, it will also be long in the January '95 
reconciliation market and prices will likely fall dramatically, perhaps to zero. If the market 
is short in December, it will remain short in January, and prices will rise sharply. If all 
facilities anticipate market imbalances correctly, the reconciliation period is useless; e.g., if 
the market is long, there will be significant downward pressure on prices. It is more likely 
for facilities to be uncertain of the market's direction, in which case they will wait one 
another out, holding RTCs as long as possible, until the market signals its direction, at 
which point it will be to late for reconciliation to be of any value to market participants. This 
behavior was found to be prevalent in the laboratory experiments discussed earlier, where 
price spikes and crashes occurred during reconciliation. 
DESIGN ALTERNATIVE 2: UNIFORM ISSUE, STAGGERED 
COMPLIANCE, .UNIFORM ALLOCATION 
In this case, AQMD allocates RTCs with uniform distribution dates, but staggers facility 
compliance dates (Figure 6). All RTCs are valid, for example, from January to December 
1994. Half the facilities file annual reports on (or after) December 31, 1994, and every 
December thereafter (Cycle 1). The other half file their fust "annual" reports on June 30, 
1994, covering only six months of the year, then their second on June 30, 1995 (Cycle 2). 
This alternative is based on the premise that it is neither essential nor necessarily more 
convenient to tie RTC issue and compliance dates. By staggering compliance dates, 
AQMD's administrative burden is lessened -- every six months, half the RECLAIM facilities 
file annual emissions reports. While that benefit is appealing, it is insufficient to justify 
adoption of this alternative, because it only partially addresses the problems associated with 
the frrst alternative (uniform RTCs). In particular, it does not provide the second, substitute 
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Figure 6 
Uniform Issue, Staggered Compliance 
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instrument needed in the final reporting period to avoid market imbalances and economic 
inefficiencies. 
Potential Problems. This alternative provides Cycle 2 facilities with a second set of 
instruments they can acquire and use for compliance -- those from Cycle 1 facilities. Cycle 
1, however, is clearly at a disadvantage, as there are no suitable RTCs available from Cycle 
2. All RTCs expire on the same date. In short, this alternative -- uniform issue, staggered 
compliance -- resolves the problems of RTCs with uniform issue and compliance dates for 
only half the RECLAIM facilities -- those assigned to Cycle 2. 
There is an important distinction here. AQMD's administrative problem is relieved through 
staggered compliance dates. Potential market imbalances and price volatility, however, are 
more difficult and more critical problems, and they are not resolved by staggering 
compliance. They can, however, be addressed through staggered issue dates, providing 
two sets of instruments to the market at any given time that can be used by any facility to 
cover emissions. 
DESIGN ALTERNATIVE 3: STAGGERED ISSUE, STAGGERED 
COMPLIANCE, ALLOCATION BETWEEN FACILITIES 
In this alternative, we stagger the issue date, stagger the compliance date (which only for 
simplicity coincides with the expiration date), and allocate RTCs between two groups of 
facilities identified by their compliance dates. Each RTC carries a one-year life beginning on 
January 1 or July 1, and expiring on December 31 or June 30. Facilities file annual reports 
coinciding with the RTC expiration dates: half on December 31 (Cycle 1), half on June 30 
(Cycle 2). (Figure 7 illustrates the allocations and reporting requirements for Facilities A 
and B.) Call the RTCs valid between January and December, "December RTCs," July to 
June credits, "June RTCs. "8 
Either> RTC (December's or June's) can be used by either facility to cover emissions 
generated during the 12-month period the RTC is valid. For example, Facility A may 
acquire June '95 RTCs from Facility B, and use them to cover emissions generated anytime 
between July '94 and June '95. Facility A may not use June '95 RTCs to cover pollutants 
BThere is no market or accounting reason for coordinating expiration and compliance dates of RTCs. The 
cycle designations could as easily and correctly reversed, or annual compliance could fall on one of the 
quanerly dates. Any mixture that divides baseline emissions equally into two groups for allocation of the 
December and June instruments is sufficient. In practice, AQMD is likely to find that the facilities assigned 
to each cycle are unequal in number, since the assignments must equate baseline emissions, not facilities. 
(See page [Allocating Staggered RTCsJ.) 
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Figure 7 
Example: Staggered RTCs (unmixed allocation) 
RTCs expiring at the end of: 
1994 1995 1996 1997 
Facility 
Dec 
A 
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Dec 
B )Ii Jun 100 90 80 
Dec 1994 
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RTC 
allocation 
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80 
Jun 1 7 
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emitted before July 1, 1994. Similarly, neither facility may use December '94 credits to 
cover emissions generated anytime after December 31, 1994. 
Advantages Staggered RTCs resolve the central underlying problem of Uniform RTCs as 
a factor of production, which is the lack of an available short-term substitute at any given 
time. With staggered credits there are always two instruments available in the market 
facilities can use to cover emissions. When December credits expire, June credits remain 
valid for another six months, and eligible for use by all facilities. 
Table 2 is an "account" of the allocations, emissions, and trading activity for Facilities A and 
B for 1994 and 1995. Facility A receives an allocation, on January I, of 200 December 
RTCs in 1994, and I80 in I995, as shown in the first quarter (QI) columns for each year. 
On July I, Facility Bis allocated 100 June RTCs in I994 and 90 in I995, shown in its third 
quarter (Q3) columns. (For simplicity, in this example we assume annual compliance.) 
At the end of QI '94, "A" reports emitting 80 pounds of pollution, and its account is 
debited. It has 120 December '94 RTCs remaining, which are "carried forward" to Q2 and 
used to cover Q2 emissions (60 pounds), leaving 60 Dec '94 RTCs for Q3. 
Facility B, meanwhile, has received its '94 allocation of 100 June '95 RTCs on July I, 
which appear in column Q3. It reports emitting 10 pounds, leaving 90 RTCs to carry 
forward. In the fourth quarter, "B" sells 20 June '95 RTCs to "A". Its account is debited to 
reflect the transfer, "A's" account credited, and the trade reported to AQMD. "A" now has 
40 RTCs available -- 20 December RTCs and 20 June RTCs -- to cover 30 pounds of 
pollution emitted in Q4. The December RTCs expire at the end of Q4, consequently, when 
it files its annual report in December I994, "A" indicates thal 20 pounds of its Q4 emissions 
are covered by 20 December RTCs, IO pounds by June RTCs acquired from Facility B. "A" 
has IO June RTCs to carry forward to QI '95. 
'B's' emissions in QI '95 jump, to 45 pounds. It holds sufficient credits (50 June RTCs) 
to cover this level, but has only five June RTCs to carry forward. "A" has credits to sell, 
which "B" buys -- 60 December '95 RTCs. The trade is executed and reported, the 
accounts updated, and both facilities remain under their allowable emission levels through 
the end of I995. Note that Facility B's June '95 RTCs are retired first in Q2 '95. They 
hold no value beyond that date. "B" files its annual report on June 30, I995. 
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Advantages. The benefits of staggering-RTC issue dates are many. For business, 
staggering the issue (and expiration dates) of RTCs, along with staggered compliance 
periods, provides greater flexibility than Uniform RTCs, particularly as each compliance 
period draws to a close. Because there are two sets of instruments available to cover 
emissions: 
1. The cost of meeting pollution standards is reduced; 
2. It is easier and less costly to respond to unanticipated events; 
3. The potential for emission peaks and/or negative employment impacts is reduced; 
and 
4. Less price volatility is expected. 
Furthermore, because the two RTCs are substitutable, market prices should more accurately 
reflect the marginal costs of pollution abatement This will raise the likelihood that marginal 
abatement costs are equated across facilities, an indication of, and requirement for, 
economic efficiency. 
Staggered RTCs can also enhance the effectiveness of reconciliation periods and decrease 
the incentives for facilities to hold credits as insurance. Remember that, with reconciliation, 
facilities had an additional opportunity to reconcile emissions information and trade RTCs to 
cover unanticipated events. They still held incentives, however, to hold excess RTCs to 
ensure against a market squeeze that reconciliation would not alleviate. If the market were 
long, due to many facilities holding excess RTCs, the "insurance premium" would be equal 
to the lost market value of the unused credits. With reconciliation and Staggered RTCs, this 
premium is lower, if not zero. 
If there is any delay in obtaining accurate emissions information, and no reconciliation 
period is available, facilities will likely report excess emissions to AQMD in order to avoid 
noncompliance penalties. Staggering the trading instrument will not relieve this problem. 
With reconciliation and Uniform RTCs, facilities may not choose to overreport, but the 
market may be long and facilities will lose the economic value of unused instruments, which 
is their insurance premium. Combining reconciliation with staggered instruments eliminates 
the premium. Reconciliation removes incentives to overreport; staggering allows unused 
RTCs to be used in the subsequent two quarters. 
Commenters have noted that the "business climate" is changing; that businesses have altered 
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their operating processes and schedules to "produce to sell. "9 In essence, businesses have 
detemtined that it is more inventory cost-effective to produce up to levels of demand, but no 
higher. They argue that this change is fairly recent and, due to their lack of experience 
producing to meet stochastic demand, it is difficult for them to accurately project emissions 
and needed RTC holdings. RECLAIM will add, at least initially, an additional level of 
uncertainty to business planning, simply because it is a new and innovative approach to 
regulation. To the extent that production is, indeed, demand driven and more stochastic, the 
additional flexibility offered by Staggered RTCs should be valuable. 
For AQMD, staggered compliance periods smooth reactions in the Basin to unexpected 
events, which means pollution periods should be more predictable and less likely to yield 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) violations; businesses will find the 
adjustment to tighter standards easier, and the risks inherent in pollution management will be 
reduced. Additionally, the administrative burden represented by annual reports can be 
spread, with orily half the facilities reporting every six months. 
Potential Problems. Facilities must enter the trading market in order to acquire the 
instruments' staggered features. If transaction costs are to be held down (an objective for 
RECLAIM), a well-functioning market must be in place and operating for this alternative to 
be fully effective. 
DESIGN ALTERNATIVE 4: STAGGERED ISSUE, STAGGERED 
COMPLIANCE, ALLOCATION WITHIN FACILITIES 
Here, rather than dividing facilities into two groups that each receive one type of Staggered 
RTC (Alternative 3), we divide each facility's allocation between the two types of Staggered 
RTCs. In other words, all facilities receive half their allocation in December RTCs, half in 
June RTCs. They receive what we term, a "mixed" allocation (Figure 8). Their allocation 
of RTCs has been "translated" into two sets of instruments (Figure 9), equal in number to 
the "unmixed" allocation provided by Alternative 3. 
Advantages. The benefits of this variation over those of Alternative 3 are important. .The 
benefits of Staggered RTCs are allocated with the RTCs. Under Alternative 3, a facility 
9see comments on initial RECLAIM Rules from the California Energy Commission, November 20. 
1992; Sharon F. Rubalcava, McClintock. Weston. Benshoof. Rochefort. Rubalcava & MacCuish, 
December I. 1992; and Richard S. Zbur, Latham & Watkins, December 11, 1992. 
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Figure 8 
Example: Staggered RTCs with Mixed Allocation 
A 
Facility 
A 
B 
RTC 
allocation 
1994 
Dec 100 
Jun 
Dec 50 
Jun 
Dec 1994 
Dec 1994 
RTCs expiring at the end of: 
1995 1996 1997 
90 80 70 
100 90 80 
45 40 35 
50 45 40 
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Figure 9 
Conversion of Uniform RTC to Staggered RTC Allocation 
Allocation of Uniform RTCs 
Dec 1994 Dec 1995 Dec 1996 
Allocation of Staggered RTCs 
Jun 1995 
Jun 1997 
150 
Dec 1994 Dec 1995 Dec 1996 
RTCs expiring at the end of: 
1994 1995 1996 1997 
Allocation 
Uniform Dec 500 400 300 
Jun 
- - -
Staggered Dec 250 200 150 
Jun 250 200 150 
could acquire a mixed allocation only by trading in the market. With Alternative 4, trading 
to obtain the benefits of the stagger becomes unnecessary, and facilities avoid the associated 
transaction costs. Finally, by mixing facility allocations, AQMD need not address the issue 
of what to do with facilities entering the program "six months late." The program can be 
initiated for all facilities simultaneously, with all receiving RTCs valid in the first six 
months, and facilities can be easily added to the program without disrupting the balance of 
instrument types. Those facilities on the June compliance schedule could file an "annual" 
report after the first six months, or under their normal schedule (after 18 months). Quarterly 
reporting schedules are unaffected. 
Potential Problems. For both Alternatives 3 and 4, the initial allocation of RTCs and 
assignment of facilities to compliance periods is somewhat more difficult at the outset than 
with Uniform RTCs. This is discussed below, with suggested approaches for resolving 
these problems. 
Experimental Analysis and Observations. We repeated the pilot experiment outlined 
on page 15, but distributed a mixed allocation of staggered credits to each subject. Again, 
subjects traded in spot and forward markets for five "years." A theoretical price path 
prediction and the actual time-series of contract prices (trades) are illustrated in Figure 10. 
Actual prices changed gradually, and there were no spikes or crashes. In Figure 11, the 
actual price time-series from the Uniform "RTC" markets is plotted against prices from the 
Staggered "RTC" experiment. The results are stark and dramatic. 
We computed the year-by-year "profits" made by subjects to determine the benefits, in our 
experiments, from each instrument design alternative (Figure 12). In our experiments, 
subjects earned 12 percent greater profits from staggered ciedits than uniform credits. We 
conclude that Staggered RTCs will be more efficient for RECLAIM facilities than Uniform 
RTCs. Note that these results are valid only for our experiment. They are not intended as 
an estimate or projection of actual market efficiency. 
ALLOCATING STAGGERED RTCs 
For the trading market to function efficiently, RTCs must be allocated in roughly equal 
proportions among compliance schedules or facility groups. Any imbalance in the supply of 
available credits will create pricing disparities and liquidity problems. Staggered credits will 
trade in separate, though related, markets. If more RTCs are allocated to and available in 
one market than the other, prices in that market will probably be lower. There will not be as 
many credits available in the other and, depending on the number of facilities participating in 
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that market, prices will probably be higher. "It is important to note that the allocation of 
RTCs is the critical factor in this analysis, not the number of facilities. 
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Comparative Price Paths 
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Figure 12 
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Half the RTCs for each pollutant regulated in RECLAIM must, in the aggregate, be allocated 
to each compliance schedule. Facilities that emit a mixture of NOx, SOx, and/or ROC, 
presumably need to be on the same cycle for each pollutant, and would find it desirable for 
all their emissions to follow a single cycle. AQMD may find that it is impossible to make 
such allocations. Consider the RTC allocations for three hypothetical facilities (assumed to 
be the only facilities in the Basin) illustrated below: 
Facility SOx NOx ROC Cycle 
A 10 0 10 1 
B 0 10 10 ? 
c 10 10 0 2 
In order to equally divide RTCs for each pollutant between cycles, different cycles must be 
assigned to Facilities A and C for SOx; A and B for ROC; and B and C for NOx. This is 
impossible. No feasible cycle assignment provides the necessary division of pollutants and 
RTCs under a uniform, unmixed allocation of credits. 
If the allocation is mixed, however, this problem is entirely eliminated. Consider our three 
facilities again: 
Facility SOx NOx ROC Cycle 
A 5 0 5 1 
5 5 2 
B 0 5 5 1 
5 5 2 
c 5 5 0 1 
5 5 2 
There are equity and administrative issues posed by staggered credits, including: 
1. Assigning facilities to a compliance schedule (either January to December or July 
to June); 
2. Accommodating the six-month "delay" between the issue of December RTCs and 
the issue of June RTCs; and 
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3. Accommodating RTCs generated by conversion of emission reduction credits 
(ERCs), area source reductions, and mobile source retirement. 
Assigning Compliance Schedules. The AQMD can assign facilities to compliance 
sched.ules using several methods. One method would allow facilities to "self-select," 
choosing their own preferences that best meet business and operating needs. This approach 
cannot guarantee that the necessary balance between schedules (and markets) will be 
provided. The assignments could instead be random, or made by lottery, following a 
predetermined formula aimed at balancing schedules and market allocations. 
Accommodating the "Start-Up" of RECLAIM. If the allocation of RTCs is divided 
between facilities -- i.e., half receive December RTCs, half June RTCs -- what should be 
done in the first six months of RECLAIM with facilities placed on the July-to-June 
compliance schedule? There are two basic alternatives: continue to regulate those facilities 
under "command and control" for six months, or proportionately distribute RTCs after 
adding six months to the duration of the program. While the latter would marginally reduce 
initial allocations, over the life of the program the cumulative allocations would be the same. 
A mixed allocation alleviates this "start-up" problem, and further reduces the marginal 
impact of spreading allocations over a longer time period. 
Accommodating Other Sources of RTCs. Both new facilities and RTCs generated · 
by ER Cs, area source reductions, and mobile source retirements can be more easily added to 
RECLAIM using the mixed allocation alternative. Mixed allocations eliminate the need to 
make several sensitive decisions. For example, when ERCs are convened into staggered 
RTCs, into which cycle will they fall? One might assume they would be assigned to the 
same compliance schedule for the facility holding the ERCs, but that would not necessarily 
maintain the equilibrium of RTCs on each schedule in each zone (see below). If AQMD 
chose to randomly assign ERCs -- in each zone, to each cycle -- facilities might argue they 
are being unfairly forced to turn to the trading market to balance their RTC allocations. A 
mixed allocation, however, allows AQMD to conven a facility ERCs into half June RTCs 
and half December RTCs, automatically maintaining a balance of RTC-types in each zone 
and without distoning facility holdings. This also represents a reduction in AQMD's 
administrative burden. The creation of RTCs from mobile source retirements and area 
source reductions can be similarly accommodated, by issuing a mixed allocation to their 
owner(s). 
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TANNER SENSITIVE ZONE: TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS 
In order to comply with the California's Tanner Sensitive Zone legislation, AQMD has 
proposed dividing the Basin into two zones, and restricting the transfer of RTCs between 
facilities in each zone. Facilities in the downwind zone would not be allowed to transfer 
RTCs to upwind facilities; however, upwind facilities could transfer RTCs to facilities in 
either zone. This is a trading restriction. It is not an additional dimension of the RTC. The 
distinction is extremely important. In restricting trades, each time ~n upwind facility sells 
RTCs to a downwind facility, the supply of upwind RTCs available to all upwind facilities 
is diminished and can never be replaced. The acquired RTCs, even if never used by the 
downwind purchaser, cannot be sold back to the upwind zone, to either the seller or another 
upwind facility, despite having originated in the upwind zone. Simply said, trades from 
upwind to downwind facilities are irreversible, with real economic inefficiencies the 
expected result. 
Upwind RTCs will command market prices higher than or equal to downwind RTCs, but 
never lower than downwind prices on a sustained basis. (If upwind RTC prices were lower 
than downwind, purchases by downwind facilities would quickly bid upwind prices to 
downwind levels. Lower upwind prices are thus not sustainable. But upwind facilities 
cannot, under the AQMD proposal, purchase downwind credits; therefore, if downwind 
RTCs are less expensive than upwind, upwind facilities cannot bid them higher.) Marginal 
abatement costs may simply be higher for upwind than downwind facilities, perhaps due to 
the composition of industries in each zone. If that is the case, the proposed trading 
restrictions preclude the arbitrage activity necessary to equate prices in the two markets, and 
the higher upwind prices will prevail. 
If, on the other hand, prices are equal and upwind facilities sell RTCs to downwind 
facilities, the number of RTCs eligible for use by upwind facilities will decline; upwind 
RTC prices will eventually rise as supply diminishes, and with them, compliance costs for 
upwind facilities. Recognizing this possibility, upwind facilities may elect to hold their 
RTCs as insurance. With AQMD's proposed trading restrictions, once an upwind RTC is 
sold to a downwind facility that RTC becomes a downwind credit, ineligible for transfer 
back to the zone of origin. The "loss" of the upwind RTC is irreversible.IO 
IOpor the proposed restriction to be effective, AQMD must be able to identify and track the location of 
sellers, buyers, and RTCs. 
35 
The irreversibility of downwind sales is an additional wedge in market forces. Facilities 
will not hold RTCs simply to cover emissions, but also to avoid the additional risk of 
having to purchase (upwind) credits at potentially higher prices in the future. While this 
approach is basic for all facilities, it is particularly acute for those in the upwind zone. 
Selling upwind RTCs to downwind facilities decreases the available supply of credits to 
cover upwind emissions, with the expected effect a rise in prices. Cheaper or not, 
downwind RTCs are not an alternative for upwind facilities. Downwind facilities will not 
face this problem and, indeed, they may see an apparent increase in the available supply of 
credits, because upwind facilities' demand has no effect on prices for RTCs transferred to 
the downwind zone. These price differences re'present a divergence in marginal abatement 
costs across zones -- an economic inefficiency exacerbated by irreversible trades. 
Alternatives to the transfer restriction could protect the sensitive zone while minimizing both 
pricing disparities and the economic inefficiencies induced by irreversible downwind trades. 
AQMD could allow "netting" of trades between zones, whereby the net number of RTCs 
transferred to the upwind zone from downwind facilities must be less than or equal to zero. 
If, for example, cumulative trading from upwind to downwind sources totaled 100 
December 1996 RTCs, upwind facilities could be permitted to transfer up to 100 December 
1996 RTCs from downwind sources. There would be no net increase in the number of 
RTCs in the upwind zone, and air quality in the Tanner Sensitive Zone would not be 
affected; the resulting air quality would be the same as if no trades had occurred. Netting 
would also improve market liquidity, broadening the utility and applicability of downwind 
credits. 
If improved air quality in the Tanner Sensitive Zone over and above that provided for the 
entire Basin is desirable, this netting alternative could be modified. Rather than a maximum 
zero net balance, the RECLAIM rules could provide for a specific net decrease in upwind 
RTCs. For example, if 100 RTCs are transferred from upwind to downwind facilities, 80 
or 90 RTCs could be allowed to transfer from the downwind to the upwind zone. While a 
lesser number would provide for improved air quality in the upwind zone (since transferred 
upwind credits cannot be replaced one-for-one), pricing problems would remain, though 
these, too, would be reduced. 
Implementation of a netting alternative requires tracking of trades across zones and 
providing the means for facilities to determine the benefits of trading across zones before 
they trade. Before availing themselves of this alternative, upwind facilities would need to be 
certain any downwind RTCs they purchase can be used to cover emissions. Interzone 
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trades will also require an ability to track time'of execution, so that RTC transfers exceeding 
the limits of netting can be identified and disallowed. Disputed trades could be resolved in 
favor of time-priority. 
These operating requirements are available in mature, sophisticated markets.11 They may 
not be immediately available in the markets offered for RTC trading, though the markets can 
be relieved of this burden if the terms of the RTC include identification of the zone of origin, 
and the trading restrictions were applied to RTCs, not trades. 
What we have in mind here is a zonal restriction that precludes upwind facilities from using 
downwind RTCs (so designated by their terms, just as they are by issue and expiration 
dates) to cover emissions. In this alternative, RTCs sold by an upwind facility to a 
downwind facility could subsequently be transferred to a facility in the upwind zone. 
Despite the first trade, the transferred RTCs remain upwind credits; their transfer does not 
alter their designation. The number of RTCs eligible for use in each zone would not change 
until credits are retired. By approaching the netting alternative in this fashion, AQMD need 
not "pre-approve" each trade nor track interzone trading. The necessity of tracking the 
location of each trader is also obviated: location is included as a dimension of the RTC. 
To illustrate both the application and advantage of this alternative, consider two upwind 
facilities -- Ul and U2 -- and two downwind facilities -- DI and D2. Assume DI is bidding 
for (wants to buy) 10 RTCs. Ul is offering 10 RTCs; it wants to sell 10 of its upwind 
credits. The two facilities agree on a price and the trade is executed. Subsequently, U2 bids 
for 5 RTCs and D2 offers 5. Under the AQMD proposal, this transaction cannot be 
completed, even though the number of upwind RTCs has declined (by 10, thanks to the 
prior trade). In our alternative (i.e., if the RTCs were designated by zone of origin), this 
trade could be executed, contingently, after the first trade had been executed and confirmed. 
Assume the facilities hold their initial allocations in either upwind or downwind RTCs 
before trading begins. 
Again, before U2 and D2 display bids and offers, Dl and Ul trade 10 RTCs. 
Subsequently, U2 wants to buy five, and 02 sell five, but D2 cannot sell downwind credits 
11 For example, the futures exchanges maintain daily price limits for each underlying commodity and 
financial instrument that bracket maximum price movements (up or down) permitted in a single day. Once 
these prices are reached, additional trades can be executed only at or between the limit for the balance of the 
day. New limits are established for subsequent trading sessions. In addition, the futures and securities 
exchanges have established "circuit breakers" lo curb the velocity of market volatility. A drop of 250 
points in the Dow Jones Industrial Average prompts a one-hour trading halt in stocks, stock options. and 
stock index options and futures. When the markets resume trading, a further 150-point decline in the Dow 
prompts a second ha!~ and may result in the markets closing early that day. 
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(under the AQMD proposal) to U2, an upwind facility, nor can it find a downwind buyer 
for its instruments. With our proposal, 02 could trade around this problem while still 
ensuring equivalent protection afforded to the sensitive zone .. The necessary trades are 
illustrated in the following "accounts": 
Dl purchases 10 upwind RTCs from Ul, a permissible trade under the AQMD proposal. 
Ul's account is debited, Dl's credited. 
UI U2 DI D2 
-1 OJI +I OJI 
Dl sells five upwind credits to D2; D2 sells five downwind credits to Dl. They "swap" 
upwind and downwind RTCs. D2 has "converted" five of its downwind holdings into 
upwind RTCs. 
UI U2 DI D2 
-JOU +I OJI 
-SU +SU 
+SD -SD 
D2 sells the five converted upwind credits to U2. The number of RTCs in the upwind zone 
before any of the trades occurred is reduced by five. 
UI U2 DI D2 
-1 OJI +I OU 
-SU +SU 
+SD -SD 
+SJ! -SJ! 
This chain of contingent trades carries transaction cos!S for the participating facilities, but 
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they may be lower than those generated by AQMD having to track interzone trades, and the 
costs of the system are borne by the users who benefit, not AQMD. 
If all bids and offers were submitted simultaneously, of course, the contingent trades would 
be unnecessary. Ul would simply sell five RTCs to U2 and five to Dl, which would then 
buy an additional five from D2. The problem addressed by contingent trades comes from 
sequential executions, both from the inability to "see" all bids and offers at one time (which 
could occur with multiple market centers trading RTCs), and from the real time between 
executions. 
In either of the alternatives, the proposed zonal restrictions pose fewer complications for the 
mixed than the unmixed allocation of staggered RTCs. If credits are allocated between 
groups of facilities, the groups cannot simply be divided by location. All upwind facilities 
cannot be on one compliance schedule with one type of RTC while downwind facilities are 
on the other. The allocations must be geographically balanced if the proposed trading 
restrictions apply. A mixed allocation within facilities removes this problem: Regardless of 
the number of facilities in either zone, the proportion of RTC-types will be the same across 
and within zones. Additionally, facilities not included in RECLAIM initially can be added to 
the program without disturbing the proportion of June to December RTCs in each zone. 
OPTIMAL NUMBER OF STAGGERS 
There are demonstrable benefits in providing two instruments for market-based regulatory 
programs, like RECLAIM. Depending on the number of facilities included in each 
program, there may be additional benefits generated in offering more than two instruments, 
though additional instruments also generate additional costs, both to facilities and to the 
regulator. Identifying and tracking each credit becomes more difficult when the number of 
different instruments increases. Since each credit trades in a "separate" market, there will be 
more markets and less overall liquidity, which raises transaction costs to facilities. To a 
certain extent, there are more advantages to the mixed allocation method than the allocation 
of credits between firms when multiple instruments are issued by the regulator. 
The point at which the costs.of multiple instruments exceed.the benefits provided has not 
been addressed, and the authors cannot determine what number of trading credits is optimal, 
for RECLAIM or any similar program. 
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Appendix: Experimental Methods, Design and Results 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide background information and details of the procedures 
and parameters utilized in experiments to evaluate uniform credits versus staggered credits in the 
design of the RECLAIM trading instrument. Since many readers may not be familiar with experimental 
methods in economics, a brief introduction on the methodology is provided. 
Part I. Overview of Experimental Methods 
Several approaches to RECLAIM trading instrument design can be proposed; however, it is 
• 
necessary to develop a method to evaluate each approach. The problem is intensified when there is no 
operational history of the market in question, and when the market design to be considered is unique 
and virtually untested. While one can gather data on environments and designs that may be analogous, 
conclusions reached by such methods cannot be rigorously supported. In the engineering sciences, 
analysis of new techniques or designs is usually evaluated through laboratory methods, simulations, 
and "testbed" procedures. This study uses these same methods in analyzing the properties of possible 
designs for the RECLAIM Trading Credit (RTC). 
Laboratory methods for analysis of economic issues have been developed and refined over the past 
30 years. Use of these techniques allows for the detailed analysis of RECLAIM trading instrument 
designs (see Plott [1986,1992] and Smith [1982,1992] for a more comprehensive review of 
experimental methods in economics). The basic process is to conduct controlled experiments in which 
live subjects act as market participant$. Each subject is provided with a detailed profit function, 
including uncertainties, costs, benefits, risks, and market procedures. 
The main purpose of conducting an experiment in any field is to obtain reliable measurements of 
the phenomena in question, so that hypotheses can be tested with confidence. The measurements are 
reliable because the parameters in the experiment are controlled by the experimenter, can be replicated, 
and the experimental outcomes can be analyzed without confounding factors. 
The key parameters in economic experiments are the values participants place on the resources 
being exchanged. These preferences are induced on individuals using monetary payoffs (see Smith 
[1976]). That is, control over preferences and exchange opportunities in an experiment is exerted by 
providing monetary rewards related to the decisions made by subjects in a prespecified manner. As 
long as the rewards are salient, relative to the subjective cost of participating in the experiment, control 
can be maintained. 
As an example, in an experimental market, subjects engage in the trade of a fictitious commodity. 
Buyers in the market put value on the "commodity" because they make money by purchasing it from 
sellers and then reselling it to the experimenter at a predetermined redemption value or schedule. 
.. .; 
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Sellers profit by capturing the difference between ·their selling price to buyers and their prespecified 
cost schedule. In the context of possible RECLAIM trading instrument designs, preferences (revenues 
minus costs) can be induced that correspond to the derived profits to a firm when emissions are one of 
the factors of production. It is these parameters that will define the economic environment of an 
experiment over which the experimenter has control. 
The next element to be specified in an economic experiment is the mechanism (institution) through 
which transactions and information are governed. This element provides the complete description of 
the policy that operates in the economic environment For the experiments reported below, this element 
allows for the testing and analysis of the comparative performance of alternative RECLAIM trading 
instrument designs. That is, given the parameters specified in the experimental environment, the 
decisions made by participants can be recorded, and then various aspects of the trading process 
(prices, allocations, profits, production decisions, etc.) can be compared. Figure 1 is an overview of 
the experiment testbed. 
Figure 1 
Experimental Testbed Overview 
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In general, subjects are recruited to participate in an experiment in which they are told they will 
earn money -- but the amount they will earn depends on the decisions made during the experiment 
(typically, undergraduate or graduate students subjects can expect to earn $15 to $20 per hour spent in 
.. 
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the experiment, although with wide variations depending on how well they make decisions). The 
specifics of the experiment are contained in a set of instructions that describe each subject's payoff 
function, the trading mechanism, and reporting/accounting rules. 
To summarize, the use of experimental methods in evaluating various market designs for 
RECLAIM allows this study to systematically evaluate policy performance in a controlled 
environment The experiments provide a source of experience and data about how various policies 
might work. The experimental environment created below attempts to discover the efficiency and price 
behavior in a very simple but detailed environment with features that are likely to be present in the 
RECLAIM market. Implementation of policies in the testbed environment provides a first-stage 
evaluation of the instrument design properties . 
-~ 
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Part II. Experiments with RTC Instrument Designs 
We will now describe the basic parameters of our experiments, the timing of decisions and 
reporting, and experimental procedures used to implement the market. 
1.1 Testbed Parameters 
1.1.1 Individual Valuations for Emissions 
The valuation for units of emission is based on the derived profit for emissions. For each 
panicipant, i, the profit function VO was induced using monetary payoffs based on the following 
structure: 
V;(x,) =max P,(q, )q, - C,(X,,Z,) 
x, 
qi= fi(Xi,Zi) 
where Xi is the level of emission "used" by firm i, Pi is the price of the product produced using Xi 
and Zi through the production function fi with associated costs Ci. For example, the actual marginal 
[V'(x)] derived per-period profit function for Subject 1 used in the experiments is provided below: 
Figure 2 
Marginal Valuation Function for Subject 1 
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The per-period market demand based on subject marginal valuations is given in Figure 3. These 
provide the basis for the demand conditions we will use for the calculations in section 3.0. 
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Figure 3 
.Underlying Market Demand Function for Emissions 
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The demand conditions were stationary; i.e., the valuations did not change from year-to-year of the 
experiment, for the entire experiment 
1.1.2 Business and Measurement Uncertainty 
In each experimental production and reporting period, participants, did not know the exact amount 
of credits needed to be in compliance. The actual number of.emission units! used was subject to 
uncertainty. At each reporting period, due to measurement and/or demand uncertainty, the user would 
first report units used (this amount determined individual value) and then opened a measurement error 
envelope that contained either a 0,1, or 2. These outcomes were known to all to be equally .li.kili 
events. This amount was added to the reported amount used to determine the actual number of units to 
be retired to meet compliance. For example, if Subject 1 reported the use of 4 units of emissions, she 
would receive the amount V(4) from her redemption value function. She would then open her current 
reporting measurement envelope and add the amount contained therein to her report. If the 
measurement error was 1, five units were transferred from her appropriate credit emissions account to 
comply. Given there are six subjects in the experiment, the probability over the sum of the 
measurement errors is a triangular distribution that is provided below (we will use this information 
when we calculate the competitive equilibrium in section 3.0.) 
1 We use the term units as opposed to pounds since such descriptive terms are not appropriate 10 use in experimental 
descriptions. 
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Figure 4 
Distribution of the Sum of Measurement Uncertainty 
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1.1.3 Emission Caps 
In the experiments, a constraint on the aggregate amount of emissions that could be assigned for a 
"year" was set (see Figure 5). The annual caps were then distributed among the participants as 
emission credits to be used in their production decisions. Notice that the aggregate emission cap falls 
each year. The terms of the credit are a major design variable in the experiment and we will discuss 
their implementation in depth in section 1.3. 
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Figure 5 
Aggregate Emissions Cap 
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1.2 Timing of Decisions, Reporting, and -Enforcement 
The experiment was divided into five intervals we called ~- Each year consisted of two 
reporting periods in which subjects made production plans, reponed emissions, and bought and sold 
emission credits. The figure below shows the timeline of events in our testbed. Notice that each 
participant first selected the production input and then determined the exact level of emissions used for 
the period. In the event that a participant does not have enough of the needed emission credits in his 
account, he was assessed a penalty of 1600 in experimental currency (this is $4.00 when convened 
into U.S. currency) for each unit over the actual emissions. This amount is subtracted from his 
earnings. 
Figure 6 
Experiment Decision and Reporting Timeline 
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1.3 Terms of the Emission Credit: The Main Design Variable 
In the experiments reported below two different emission credits were designed: a uniform annual 
credit and a staggered credit. 
1.3.l Uniform Credit with Reconciliation Market 
Under this instrument design, each participant was allocated a portion of the annual cap defined in 
Figure 5. This allocation provided a participant with a portfolio of emission credits for each of the five 
years of the experiment that could be used against actual emissions in each year. Participants could 
only use current year credits in their account to meet actual emissions. Participants could add or 
subtract units to any of their five annual credit accounts by buying and selling credits in the appropriate 
market. Thus, at anytime during the experiment, participants could trade in both spot and forward 
annual credit markets. For example, in Year 1 there were four forward markets (Years 2,3,4, and 5) 
plus the current year spot market; in Year 3 there were two forward markets (Year 1 and 2 credits are 
retired). 
At the end of each year, a reconciliation period was provided to allow participants (who did not 
have enough emissions credits in their current year account to meet their actual emissions) to try to 
purchase credits from those individuals with unused credits in their current year account. It should be 
noted that any unused credits held by a participant would expire wonhless, and the penalty for 
noncompliance was 1600 per unit. The annual caps were distributed to participants by period as 
described in Table 1 below: 
Table 1 
Annual Allocations of Emissions 
Participant Year 1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Years 
Allocation Allocation Allocation · Allocation Allocation 
Subject 1 6 4 4 2 0 
Subject 2 16 12 10 10 8 
Subject 3 6 4 4 4 4 
Subject 4 14 12 10 8 6 
Subject 5 18 12 10 8 6 
Subject 6 10 8 4 2 0 
Total 70 52 42 34 24 
1.3.2 Staggered Credit Design • 
The annual cap profile in Figure 5 was divided into two allocations per· year. Thus, at the 
beginning of Year 1 there are 10 markets open (one spot market and nine forward markets). The 
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structure of the staggered credit for compliance pilrposes is provided in Figure 7. The figure shows 
that at the first reporting period in Year 1, credits held in either markets 1 and 2 can be used for 
compliarice; i.e., each credit instrument has a two-period life. 
Figure 7 
Structure of the Staggered Credit Instrument 
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The annual caps were distributed to participants by period as described in Table 2 below: 
Table 2 
Staggered Initial Allocation of Emissions Credits 
Participant Market Allocations 
1 2 3 4 s 6 7 8 9 1 0 
Subject I 3 3 2 2 2 2 0 0 
Subject 2 10 6 5 7 5 5 7 3 4 4 
Subject 3 5 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Subject 4 10 4 8 4 5 5 4 4 5 
Subject 5 10 8 5 7 5 5 6 2 3 3 
Subject 6 8 2 5 3 2 2 2 0 0 0 
Total 42 28 27 25 20 22 22 12 14 IO 
1.4 Trading Mechanism 
Credits in either the uniform annual credit or the staggered credit design could be traded through an 
electronic real-time trading market called the multiple unit double auction (see Johnson et al. [1989]). 
This market uses the same rules found on major stock exchanges in the United States (e.g., New York 
·.] 
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. _,, 
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Stock Exchange, Pacific Stock Exchange, etc.), where traders submit bids and asks with the bid-ask 
spread determined by a standard bid-ask improvement rule. Subjects could trade in any markets that 
were open so that spot and forward contracts could be made. Short-selling was prohibited. The 
software maintained all of the cash accounts and credit accounts across all markets and participants. 
Thus, subjects were always aware of their credit holdings in all markets. 
2.0 Experimental Procedures 
Subjects foi the experiments were recruited from the undergraduate population at the California 
Institute of Technology. A prerequisite to be in the experiment was that the participants needed to be 
familiar with the electronic double auction software. Thus, each participant had to have participated in a 
previous unrelated market experiment. Each experiment lasted approximately two hours. The 
instructions used in the experiments are provided in A.I. Two experiments, one for each of the 
emission credit designs, were conducted. 
3.0 Competitive Equilibrium Predictions 
3.1 Uniform Annual Credit Market 
For the annual credit market, the demand for credits requires the calculation of what occurs in the 
reconciliation market. Since the demand for credits in the reconciliation period is elastic at 1600 per 
unit, the penalty for noncompliance and the supply of credits is elastic at 0, unused credits expire 
worthless, the market supply and demand is similar to what is depicted in the figure below. 
Figure 8 
Supply and Demand During Reconciliation 
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Thus, the predicted competitive price during reconciliation will be 0 if the market is long (supply 
greater than demand), 1600 if the market is shon, and the price can be anywhere between 0 and 1600 
if supply and demand match (we use the midpoint of 800 for calculation purposes). Given this 
outcome during the reconciliation period, for any year the individual demand for each participant is 
determined by solving a maximization problem based on the probability of the excess demand valued 
during reconciliation. With this structure we can calculate the ex ante price path and production 
decision for the market This information is provided in the figure below. 
Figure 9 
Expected Competitive Equilibrium Price with Annual Uniform Credit 
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3.2 Staggered Credit Market Predictions 
For the staggered credit, under the competitive assumption, each participant would react according 
to a Kuhn-Tucker maximization problem based on carryover amounts. In general, given that demand is 
static, individuals would like to smooth production so that use is the same for each period. However, 
since there are only limited carryforward possibilities, production cannot necessarily be leveled across 
periods. Indeed, one clear prediction is that participants should report use of the shortest vintage 
credits in their compliance reports first The equilibrium price and production paths are given below: 
Figure 10 
Expected Competitive Equilibrium Price Path with Staggered Credit 
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3.3 Comparative Predictions Uniform vs -staggered 
Over the life of the experiment, we can compare the predicted price path and efficiency for the 
uniform vs staggered credit. The figure below shows the price path differences and the comparative 
profitability (without discounting) on the participants in this experimental environment. 
Figure 11 
Comparative Price Path: Uniform Minus Staggered 
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The price and production paths are based on stationary demand and no discounting of profits. 
4.0 Experimental Results 
In this section we provide the results of the experiments in terms of price formation, credit usage 
patterns, and comparative performance of the credit designs. 
4.1 Price and Production Paths 
4.1.1 Uniform Credit 
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Figure 12 presents the time path of prices under the uniform annual credit instrument design. The 
figure shows the spot and forward contracts and prices during the reconciliation periods. 
Figure 12 
Uniform Credit Market Results 
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Result 1: The price path exhibits price spikes or deflation during the reconciliation periods. 
Figure 13 supplies the use of emission credits over time. 
Figure 13 
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Result 2: The use pattern shows that when credits are plentiful during the first half of the year, 
production is higher than predicted and thus falls in the later half of the year. 
Result 3: The short and long conditions in the market result in either penalties or unused credits in the 
market and thus in lost profit opportunities. 
4.1.2 Staggered Credits 
Figure 14 presents the time path of prices under the staggered credit instrument design. The figure 
shows the spot and forward contract prices along with the predicted equilibrium price path. 
Result 4: The price path is flat except for a slight increase in the last period from over-use in earlier 
periods. 
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Figure 15 
Credit Use by Period: Predicted-Actual Staggered Credit 
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Result 5: Subjects use more credits in the early years than that predicted from the competitive model. 
4.2 Comparative Analysis 
We now tum to the comparative performance of the two credit designs in terms of price volatility 
and subject profitability. 
4.2.1 Price Variation 
Figure 16 provides the price paths of the staggered and uniform credits. 
Result 6: Prices have significantly less variation in the staggered credit design when compared to the 
uniform credit. 
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Uniform Annual 
Credit 
Staggered Credit 
Figure 17 shows the relative profit path of the staggered credit, i.e., total subject profit under 
staggered credits divided by total subject profit under uniform credits. 
Figure 17 
Cumulative Relative Efficiency: Staggered/Uniform 
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Result 7: Profits are significantly higher (12%) with the staggered credits when compared to the 
uniform credits. 
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Part III. Instructions to Subjects 
Staggered Credit 
1. Redemption Values 
You are about to participate in an experiment in which you will make decisions in a market. Your 
profits from the experiment will be in terms of francs, which you can convert into U.S. dollars at a rate 
of francs to one U.S. dollar. (Thus, the more francs you earn the more U.S. currency you will 
earn.) Any profits you make in the experiment are yours to keep. You will be paid at the end of the 
experiment. 
The experiment will be divided into a series of years. Each year will consist of two interims in 
which you will make decisions. Your packet contains a Redemption Value Sheet that describes the 
value to you of an item we will call X. This is private information and you should llil1 reveal these 
values to other participants. Below is a sample Redemption Value Sheet. 
Number of Units of 
Item X You Own 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Redemption Value Sheet 
Additional Value 
to You 
900 
700 
600 
300 
100 
0 
0 
Total Value 
to You 
900 
1600 
2200 
2500 
2600 
2500 
2500 
The Sheet is used to detennine the value of units you apply to your compliance report at the end of 
each interim. For example, with the table above, if at an interim in a year you use three units in your 
compliance report you would receive a value of 2200 francs. If you were to use four units in you 
compliance report instead of three units you would receive an additional 300 francs in value. The 
difference between your values from the compliance report and the purchase and sale of units of X will 
detennine your earnings. 
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2. Initial Allocations of X for Each Year 
At the beginning of this experiment you will be given an allocation of X, which you own, for each 
Year:interim in the experiment. The amounts are listed on your screen under the Inventory Box. For 
example if you had the screen below you would have an initial allocation of units of X with 7 units in 
Year !:interim I, three units in Year !:interim 2, four units in Year 2:interim I and Year 2:interim 2, three 
·' 
units in Year 3:interim 1 and Year 3:interim 2, etc. 
ID: Cash on Hand: 
BID ASK 
Marlcet Period Time ID Price 0 ID Price n lnventorv 
YI : II I 6:00 7 
YI: 12 I 6:00 3 
Y2: II I 6:00 4 
Y2: 12 I 6:00 4 
Y3: II I 6:00 3 
Y3: 12 I 6:00 3 
Y4: II I 6:00 3 
Y4: 12 I 6:00 2 
YS: II I 6:00 I 
YS: 12 I 6:00 2 
You can add to your inventory ofX for a Year:interim by buying units in that market (we will describe 
how you buy and sell in this market later). If you purchase units the amount you spend will be 
deducted from the values you receive. You can reduce your inventory by selling units in the market. 
The amount you receive from sales is added to your values. Thus, at the end of each interim your 
earnings are determined from the units you apply to compliance for redemption value and the 
purchases - sales from the market. For example, from the Sample Redemption Value Sheet, if you 
used four units of X for Year !:interim 1 compliance, you would obtain 2500 francs. If you spent 1000 
francs purchasing units during the interim and sold units in return for 500 francs, your profits for the 
interim would be: 
. ' 
., 
Redemption 
~ 
2500 -
Purchases 
1000 + 
.s..aks_ Interim Earnin~s 
• 500 = 2000 Francs 
3. Compliance Reporting and Inventory Accounting 
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When the experiment starts, the market for trading units will be open for six minutes. At the end of six 
minutes you will be asked to fill out a compliance report form for Year !:interim I. You can only use 
units in your Year !:interim I inventory to apply to the report. These will be used to determine your 
redemption value for the interim. You will then subtract purchases and add sales revenues to find your 
interim earnings. However, any unused Year !:interim I units can be used for your Year !:interim 2 
compliance. The table below shows the inventory you can use for your interim compliance reports. 
Inventory Units and Compliance Report Applications 
Compliance 
Period Year Interim 
Yl ; II l I 
YI: I2 1 1 
1 
Y2: I1 1 2 
2 
Y2: I2 2 1 
2 2 
Y3: I1 2 2 
Y3: I2 3 1 
2 
Y4: I1 3 2 
4 1 
Y4: I2 4 1 
4 2 
Y5: I1 4 2 
1 
Y5: I2 5 1 
2 
' ' 
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Once you submit your compliance report you will open your Year !:interim I measurement report, 
which contains one of three equally fuly numbers { 0, 1, 2}. You will add this number to your 
compliance report number to determine the amount of units that will be retired from your Year !:interim 
I inventory. For example, if you used four units in your compliance report and you open your Year 
!:interim I measurement report and find a 1, your Year !:interim I inventory will be reduced by five 
units. In the event you do not have enough units in the appropriate inventories, you will pay a franc 
penalty out of your current interim earnings. An example of the reporting and retirement of units is 
provided below: 
Compliance and Retirement Report 
Year Interim Compliance Measurement Retirement 
Inventorv 
4 + 5 
2 + _+_ 
2 + = _+_ 
4. Accounting 
At the end of each interim you will account for your earnings using the following accounting form: 
Year: Interim 
I: I 
1:2 
2: I 
2:2 
Value- Pun: bases- Penalty+ Sales+ 
Remember that at each interim you will use the following procedure: 
1. Fill-in your compliance amount in the reporting sheet. 
Capital = Profits 
u. Fill-in the total redemption value based on your compliance report in the accounting sheet 
iii. Open your year:interim measurement envelope and place the measurement amount in your 
reporting sheet. 
1v. Retire the units from current year.interim or previous year:interim inventory or pay a per-unit 
penalty charge of and enter the penalty amount in your accounting sheet. 
v. Subtract the cost of the units you purchased and add the revenue from your sales. In addition, 
add in the capital provided to you and calculate the profits. 
' ' 
61 
5. Timing Review 
Start Interim l Interim 2 Interim 1 Interim 2 Interim l Interim 2 Interim 1 
Report Report 
Retire Retire 
Yl:ll y 1:11 first 
AccounL Yl:l2 next 
Account 
6. Trading Mechanism 
Software Tutorial 
• [ ' 1. 
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Instructions to Subjects 
1. Redemption Values [uniform credits] 
You are about to participate in an experiment in which you will make decisions in a market. Your 
profits from the experiment will be in terms of francs, which can convert into U.S. dollars at a rate of 
francs to one U.S. dollar. Thus, the more francs you earn the more U.S. currency you will earn. Any 
profits you make in the experiment are yours to keep. You will be paid at the end of the experiment 
The experiment will be divided into a series of years. Each year will consist of two interims in 
which you will make decisions. Your packet contains a Redemption Value Sheet that describes the 
value to you of an item we will call X. This is private information and you should Il.Q1 reveal these 
values to other participants. Below is a sample Redemption Value Sheet. 
Number of Units of 
Item X You Own 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Redemption Value Sheet 
Additional Value 
to You 
900 
700 
600 
300 
100 
0 
0 
Total Value 
to You 
900 
1600 
2200 
2500 
2600 
2500 
2500 
The sheet is used to determine the value of units you apply to yout compliance report at the end of each 
interim. For example, with the table above, if at an interim in a year you use three units in your 
compliance report, you would receive a value of 2200 francs. 1f you were to use four units in you 
compliance report, instead of three units, you would receive an additional 300 francs in value. The 
difference between your values from the compliance report and the purchase and sale of units of X will 
determine your earnings. 
2. Initial Allocations of X for Each Year 
At the beginning of this experiment you will be given an allocation of X, which you own, for 
each year in the experiment. The amounts are listed on your screen under the Inventory Box. For 
example, if you had the screen below you would have an initial allocation of units of X with 10 units 
in Year 1, eight units in Years 2 and 3, and six units in Years 4 and 5. 
.. I I ll 
ID: 
Market 
Year 1 
Year2 
Year3 
Year4 
Year5 
Period 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Time ID 
6:00 
6:00 
6:00 
6:00 
6:00 
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Cash on Hand: 
BID ASK 
Price Q ID Price Q Inventory 
10 
8 
8 
6 
6 
You can add to you inventory of X for a year by buying units in that market (we will describe how 
you buy and sell in this market later). If you purchase units the amount you spend will be deducted 
from the values you receive. You can reduce your inventory by selling units in the market The amount 
you receive from sales is added to your values. Thus, at the end of each interim your earnings are 
determined from the units you apply to compliance for redemption value and the purchases - sales from 
the market. For example, from the sample Redemption Value Sheet, if you used four units of X for 
Year 1 :interim 1 compliance_ you would receive 2500 francs. If you spent 1000 francs purchasing 
units during the interim and sold units in return for 500 francs your profits for the interim would be: 
Redemption 
~ Purchases 
2500 - 1000 + 500 = 
Interim Earnine;s 
2000 Francs 
3. Compliance Reporting and Inventory Accounting 
When the experiment starts, the market for trading units will be open for six minutes. At the end of 
six minutes you will be asked to fill out a compliance report for Year 1 :interim 1. You can only use 
units in your Year 1 inventory to apply to the report. These will be used to determine your redemption 
value for the interim. You will then subtract purchases and add sales revenues to find your interim 
earnings. 
Once you submit your compliance report, you will open your year:interim measurement report 
which contains one of three eaually J.i.kili numbers {0, 1, 2). You will add this number to your 
compliance report number to determine the amount of units that will be retired from your Year 1 
inventory. For example, if you used four units in your compliance report and you open your Year 
1 :interim 1 measurement report and find a 1, your Year 1 inventory will be reduced by five units. In 
the event you do not have enough units in your current year inventory to meet the retirement amount, 
you will pay a_ franc penalty out of your current interim earnings. An example of the reporting and 
retirement of units is provided below: 
' . 
Year: Interim Compliance 
1: 1 
1:2 
2: 1 
Amount 
4 
4. Accounting 
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Compliance and Retirement Report 
Measurement Retireme_nt 
Inventory 
+ = 5 
+ = _+_ 
+ _+_ 
At the end of each interim you will account for your earnings using the following accounting form: 
Year: Interim 
1:1 
1:2 
2: 1 
2:2 
Value- Purchases- Penalty+ Sales+ Capita! = Profits 
Remember that at each interim you will use the following procedure: i. Fill in your compliance amount 
in the reporting sheet ii. Fill in the total redemption value based on your compliance report in the 
accounting sheet iii. Open your interim:year measurement envelope and place the measurement 
amount in your reporting sheet iv. Retire the units from your current year inventory or pay a per unit 
penalty charge of_ and enter the penalty amount in your accounting sheet v. Subtract the cost of the 
units you purchased and add the revenue from your sales. In addition, add in the capital provided to 
you and calculate the profits 
5. Timing Review 
Start Interim 1 Interim 2 
6_ Trading Mechanism 
Software Tutorial 
Interim 1 Interim 2 Interim 1 Interim 2 Interim I 
.. { j .i 
Participant ____ _ 
Compliance and Retirement Report 
Year.Interim Compliance 
Amount 
1:1 
1:2 
2:1 
2:2 
3:1 
3:2 
4:1 
4:2 
5:1 
5:2 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Measurement 
Amount 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
Retirement 
Amount 
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Year 
Inventory 
.. { ) 4 
Participant: 
Year: 
Interim 
1:1 
1:2 
2:1 
2:2 
3:1 
3:2 
4:1 
4:2 
5:1 
5:2 
Value-
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Accounting Sheet 
Purchases- Penalty+ Sales+ Capital = Profits 
i 
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